Nine Turkish ministers accompanied their president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, on a state visit to Iraq which held symbolic importance at every level. This may appear to be a significant initiative on Turkey's part to open up further and reach a more comprehensive agreement with Iraq on various issues. However, all these efforts are, directly or indirectly, tied to the extent of Baghdad's cooperation in neutralising the fighters of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), considered as ‘terrorists’ by Ankara.

Turkey maintained its traditional positions in Iraq, notably participatory cooperation, preservation of Iraqi territorial integrity, problem-solving and protection of the Turkmen component. However, Ankara had strict priorities linked to its internal security by conducting large-scale military operations to ‘destroy terrorism at its source’. This specifically involves targeting PKK centres of influence in scattered areas, including the cities of Sinjar and Makhmur in Nineveh province, as well as villages throughout the Kurdistan region, such as Soran, Sidakan, Qandil, Zakho, Zab, Al-Amadiyah, Heftanin, and Kanîmasî.

Erdoğan aspires to open all doors to Iraq, and during his recent visit, he displayed a strengthened willingness by wearing a smile, unlike his usual demeanour. This intention was demonstrated through several scenes and comments, favouring the signing of two strategic framework agreements, as well as 26 memoranda of understanding across various fields and sectors. In reality, all these efforts are intertwined with the opening of a new path for Ankara, whose objective is to further expand in Iraq, particularly in the mountainous regions, to put an end to the presence of the Kurdistan Workers' Party. According to my information, Iraq has granted authorisation to Turkey to conduct this extensive operation.

An Iraqi-Kurdish-Turkish agreement has been reached, permitting Ankara to carry out a military operation in the Kurdistan region of northern Iraq, encompassing an area of over 40 kilometres, with the aim of targeting PKK enclaves. Baghdad has requested that the operation be focused on sparsely populated areas. In exchange, Turkey will revitalise the Tigris and Euphrates rivers through its control of the water issue. It will also begin the first stages towards the development of a road connecting the southern city of Basra to Turkish territory.

In reality, Turkey's position is complicated by the implicit alliance between the Patriotic Union Party of Kurdistan, led by Bafel Jalal Talabani in Suleymaniye, and the Iraqi armed factions supporting the PKK. Although Ankara views this alliance as 'marginal' and potentially short-lived, it could disrupt the Turkish military operation, especially as the Iraqi factions, which are close to Iran, may retaliate against Turkey. Indeed, the leaders of these factions display evident anger towards Erdoğan, as the Turkish President has been exposed to media campaigns financed by the pro-Iranian political camp in Iraq; moreover, the factions' leaders have on several occasions threatened to attack Turkish forces.

According to some reports, Turkey is considering conducting bombing raids on locations near Kirkuk, a city abundant in social components and oil resources. The country has even sought permission from the Turkmen population to target specific sites in the city of Kirkuk, but has not obtained it because of the refusal of the Arab parties allied with the Shiite factions. Additionally,

Ankara does not want to cause an uproar in Baghdad, as the Iraqi government has taken a firm stance during Erdoğan's visit, as evidenced in economic reports indicating a significant increase in Turkish product imports, reaching nearly $13 billion in 2023.

In addition to the request for an extended military operation against the PKK, which garnered endorsement from Baghdad and then received the approval and blessing of Erbil, the capital of the Kurdistan region, the Turkish delegation asked for separating trade from contentious issues.

This is where the role of the Iraqi negotiator came into play, stating that any Turkish incident involving civilians or mistakes in the handling of the PKK would result in firm stances from Baghdad.

It seems obvious that Ankara holds significant power in military, security and economic domains, as well as control over water resources, whereas Baghdad’s wealth is solely derived from oil sale. The substantial proposals and opportunities that Turkey intends to offer Iraq actually benefit Ankara more than Baghdad, and it seems that all circumstances are aligning with Turkish preferences.

For instance, the rail and road project connecting the major port of Al-Faw to Basra, passing through numerous Iraqi cities (Al-Diwaniyah, Al-Najaf, Karbala, Baghdad and Mosul) and stretching to the Turkish border, ultimately reaching the Turkish port of Mersin, would provide a new road to Istanbul and Europe. Iraq would benefit from a shortcut to Europe, while Turkey would gain financial benefits, power, influence and a new route.

Despite the enthusiasm surrounding the rail line development project, Iraq's commitments regarding the neutralisation of the PKK and its non-opposition to the Turkish method of combating them could change depending on the local political climate in Baghdad.

However, one external factor, to which Baghdad seems to attach little importance, is the road that Saudi Arabia aims to construct in collaboration with India. While this significant issue cannot be thoroughly explored in this article, it presents a tangible obstacle and a genuine concern.

The success of Erdoğan's visit to Baghdad and Erbil, in governmental, political and event terms, is strategically conditioned by the stability of the internal political situation in Mesopotamia.

The situation seems stable so far. Indeed, the Shiite ‘Coordination Framework’ and its allied components are keen on preserving the stability of Mohammed Shiaa Al-Sudani's government for as long as possible, especially in light of threats posed by the young religious leader Moqtada Al-Sadr, who wants to reverse his decision to withdraw from the political stage, as well as existential threats stemming from its struggling economy and water scarcity.

Events may temporarily proceed as planned in the short term, but in the long term, Turkey stands to emerge as the primary beneficiary, while Iraq, with its faltering system, will eagerly seek a breath of life from any possible direction.